



Belem ‘Mutirão’ decision: A delicate balance between implementation and ambition

Kathmandu, Dec 3 (Chhegu Palmuu): The COP30 climate talks in Belém, Brazil, which concluded a day later on 22 Nov, saw protracted negotiations in nailing a consensus on the lead “Mutirão” decision, of the [Belém political package](#), fought over with much intensity and sleepless nights, to reflect a “delicate balance” between “implementation” and “ambition”, to address climate change.

The adopted [Global Mutirão: Uniting humanity in a global mobilisation against climate change](#) decision, comprises preambular language followed by operational paragraphs under three headers: I. United in celebration of the 10-year anniversary of the Paris Agreement; II. From negotiation to implementation: Paris Agreement policy cycle fully in motion; III. Responding to urgency: accelerating implementation, solidarity and international cooperation.

[Led by the COP30 Presidency in the form of “consultations”, as agreed during the adoption of the agenda (see [TWN Update](#)), the Mutirão – “collective mobilisation” – text dealt with the following four agenda item proposals: [Implementation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement](#) (on the mandatory provision of finance from developed to developing countries), by the **Like - Minded Developing Countries**

(**LMDC**); [Promoting international cooperation and addressing the concerns with climate change related trade-restrictive unilateral measures](#) (such as, the European Union’s carbon border adjustment mechanisms), by the **LMDC**; [Responding to the synthesis report on nationally determined contributions \(NDCs\) and addressing the 1.5C ambition and implementation gap](#), by the **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)**; [Reporting and review pursuant to Article 13 of the Paris Agreement: Synthesis of biennial transparency reports \(BTRs\)](#), by the **European Union (EU)**.]

These highly contentious issues involving implementation and ambition, saw entrenched divergent views among Parties throughout the negotiations, which saw a push and pull exercise mainly along North-South lines, that led to the final delicate compromise reached to a nail-biting finish.

According to sources familiar with the negotiations, the major behind-the-scenes drama centred on the failed attempt to secure agreement on a “roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels.” This push became the focal point of a broader battle, as developed countries effectively worked to dilute and water down language on tripling adaptation finance—

a demand strongly advanced by the **African Group** and the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, and widely supported by other developing nations. [See details below].

GUARDRAILS FOR THE TALKS

The Presidency consultations on the Mutirão text was guided early on by the following understanding of “Guardrails for safety and trust: preserving the architecture and the policy cycle of the Paris Agreement [PA]; constructive and respectful engagement on issues related to all four agenda item proposals (which means no finger pointing); preserving the nationally determined nature of NDCs; and preserving the scope and mandate of GST2” [the second global stocktake which will take place in 2028].

Despite these “guardrails,” negotiations unfolded quite differently—particularly around the persistent push for the annual consideration of NDCs linked to mitigation ambition, the reporting of implementation gaps, and their connection to the first global stocktake (GST1). Many Parties viewed this as undermining the established five-year GST cycle of collective assessment and as a challenge to preserving the architecture and policy rhythm of the Paris Agreement.

By contrast, discussions on the financial obligations of developed countries and on unilateral trade measures—issues that are explicitly provided for under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, and warranted a “top-down” operational approach—were met with staunch resistance. Developed countries drew firm lines in the sand, treating these matters as their “super red-lines.”

The critical issue of means of implementation, in particular, the “provision of finance” by developed countries as reflected in the proposal on Article 9.1, saw the usual North-South battle. The **G77 and China** was in support of this, while developed countries vehemently pushed back, despite this being a mandatory legal obligation. The **G77 and China** led by **Iraq** stated the importance of Article 9.1 to developing countries, “which is key to the implementation of climate action. This includes the provision of finance under 9.1 of the PA from developed to developing countries, as well as Article 4.3 of the Convention”.

The issue of unilateral trade measures, was primarily opposed by the **EU**, calling for deletion of the entire “trade” text from the final decision. On the issue of the annual consideration of the NDCs and BTRs synthesis report and its linkage to the implementation of the GST1 outcomes (in particular, paragraph 28 on global efforts to “transition away from fossil fuels”), was mainly opposed by the **LMDC**, the **Arab Group**, and **Russia**, similarly calling for deletion of text in this regard.

The developed countries’ reluctance to show political will and good faith on financial commitments and international cooperation—while at the same time pressing for a one-sided, top-down “annual” ratcheting of mitigation ambition by individual countries, absent any principles of equity or differentiation—remained at the heart of the deep divide over the Mutirão text negotiations until the very end.

The Presidency grouped the key sticking points into three clusters—Article 9.1/Finance for mitigation and adaptation, NDCs, and Trade—which ultimately demanded a carefully balanced text to secure consensus after long hours of arduous negotiations.

THE PUSH AND PULL IN FINDING BALANCE

In the morning of Friday 21 Nov [the scheduled day of closing], when the [Presidency proposal](#) (of 21 Nov) of a revised Mutirão text was presented as a “very delicate, fragile package” of “finding balance”, it was outrightly rejected by the **EU** led by **Denmark**, the **Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)**, and **Colombia** for the **Independent Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean States (AILAC)**, who berated the absence of a “roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels” in the text and of a very weak “mitigation” component in the context of NDCs implementation to “keep 1.5C alive”. An option contained in the preceding first [draft text](#) (of 18 Nov) that carried references to the “roadmap” on “transitioning away from fossil fuels” had been dropped from the revised text.

The **EU** warned the Presidency of a “real risk” of not reaching an agreement. The COP30 President **Ambassador Do Lago** stated its rationale that seeing no clear consensus on the issue with irreconcilable divergences, it wasn’t included in the

text.

The other “red-line” stated by the **EU** and the **EIG** was on the issue of “provision” of “adaptation finance” in the text [which led to an eventual watered down decision]. They made clear that their commitment was solely within the parameters of the COP29 decision on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG) adopted last year, [referring to a mobilisation goal with developed countries taking the lead]. This view was also supported by the **United Kingdom (UK)**. [The initial language in the text on “tripling adaptation finance compared to 2025 levels by 2030” was watered down to tripling it by 2035 with no baseline reference at all]. Furthermore, **Denmark** for the **EU** also called for deletion of the “Trade” text.

Consultations spiralled into a deadlock, mainly due to absence of consensus to discuss the issue of the roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels.

In the afternoon of 21 Nov, following a deadlock in the morning talks, there was a shift in gear and mode of work into a “smaller group” consultations by the Presidency, with only “two representatives per group and countries without groups, present [and held behind closed doors]. This final stretch was meant to iron out a “consensus” Mutirão decision to be adopted as the lead COP30 outcome, the next day on 22 Nov.

In the smaller group Presidency consultations that followed, sources who spoke to TWN, shared that in stark contrast to the hue and cry and eventual deadlock in the morning talks of 21 Nov, there was no discussion at all on the “roadmap” on “fossil fuels”, which was then revealed as no longer being a point of contention and red-line for developed countries.

It then came to light that for the developed countries, the issue of “adaptation finance” [paragraph 53 of the [Presidency proposal](#) (of 21 Nov)] instead took precedence as the top red-line.

Developed countries also made clear that their other red-line issue was in ensuring the “strengthening” of NDCs’ mitigation ambition and implementation gaps [particularly, in paragraph 42 on the “Belém Mission to 1.5”], which they

lamented as missing in the text, with their push on linkage to GST1.

It is worth noting that when the revised Presidency proposal of 21 Nov. was presented “as is,” without being reopened, it was initially acceptable to the **LMDC, Arab Group, African Group, BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China), and ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America)**. This formed the starting point for negotiations during the smaller group consultations convened by the Presidency.

However, **AILAC, the LDCs [Least Developed Countries], and AOSIS** wanted “small tweaks” to the text, while the **EU, UK** and the **Umbrella Group** of developed countries did not support the text at all. The **EU** Commissioner for Climate **Wopke Hoekstra**, Ministers **Ed Miliband (UK)** and **Chris Bowen (Australia)** were all present in the talks – and thus, the text had to be opened to “tweaks” or “surgical insertions” to reach an agreement.

Sources said that groups wanted edits mainly to paragraph 42 [Belém Mission to 1.5] and paragraph 53 [adaptation finance], while some wanted to open the text on “trade”, besides also on “forests” [the other roadmap on halting and reversing deforestation]. Paragraph 42, however, faced considerable pushback from some developing countries, given the rationale that the decision already focused enough on NDC “ambition”.

[Paragraph 42 read, “Also decides to launch, under the guidance of the Presidencies of its sixth, seventh and eighth sessions of the CMA, the “Belém Mission to 1.5”, aimed at enabling ambition and implementation of NDCs and NAPs, to reflect on accelerating the implementation and international cooperation and investments in NDCs and NAPs across mitigation and adaptation, and requests these Presidencies to produce a report summarising the work as they conclude the work by the eighth session of the CMA”.]

Negotiations, eventually, focused on the following specific paragraphs, with text opened for “tweaks”: paragraph 53 (on adaptation finance); paragraph 41 (on “Global Implementation Accelerator”), and paragraph 56 (on dialogue related to international cooperation and role of trade). Further, paragraph

35 (on NDC alignment towards net zero) was also opened for a tweak to ensure “balance” in the text. (See details below.)

THE ROADMAP ON TRANSITIONING AWAY FROM FOSSIL FUELS

Following the release of the first [draft text](#) (18 Nov) as a Presidency proposal, bilaterals were conducted, followed by continued consultations and shuttle diplomacy on 19 Nov, including with political engagement elevated to a meeting between Brazilian President Lula and negotiating groups with the purpose of deliberating on the “key COP30 issues” and on the “way forward”. The issue of the “roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels”, was said to have emerged during the talks with President Lula.

The draft text contained sets of options with language such as “just, orderly and equitable transition roadmaps, including to progressively overcome their dependency on fossil fuels”[paragraph 35]“transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner”[paragraph 44].

This direction of the negotiations triggered many delegates, representing diverse groups and Parties [from Asia, Africa, Arab region and Latin America], to meet the Presidency on the night of 19 Nov, expressing their strong objection to the issue of “fossil fuels” which had failed to adhere to the guardrails of the consultations and crossed their “red-lines” in terms of right to development, national sovereignty, and the nationally determined nature of the NDCs.

It is learnt that the Presidency next presented compromise textual proposals for consideration which later appeared in the revised [Presidency proposal](#) (of 21 Nov), but this text was totally rejected by the EU, led by **Denmark**, the **EIG**, and **Colombia** for **AILAC**, since it no longer contained references to the “roadmap” and on “transitioning away from fossil fuels”.

However, as was later revealed in the smaller group Presidency consultations, this particular issue on fossil fuels did not emerge in the discussions, and was thus considered no longer a contentious, red-line issue.

MAIN HIGHLIGHTS OF THE FINAL COMPROMISE

Work programme on climate finance, including on Article 9.1

In the first [draft text](#) (of 18 Nov), a stronger option language appeared which read as follows: “Decides to establish a three-year Belem work program and legally-binding action plan on the implementation of Article 9, paragraph 1, with a view to, inter alia, developing a common climate finance reporting and accounting methodology, improved budgetary processes and fair burden-sharing arrangements among developed country Parties”. This language was pushed by the **LMDC** and the **Arab Group**.

In the revised text of the [Presidency proposal](#) (of 21 Nov), the language was diluted and read as follows: “Decides to establish a two-year work programme on climate finance, including on Article 9 paragraph 1 in the context of Article 9 as a whole [Footnote 2: Without prejudging the process on the implementation of the new collective quantified goal.]”

The final paragraph 54 of the adopted [Mutirão decision](#) provides: “*Decides to establish a two-year work programme on climate finance, including on Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement in the context of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement as a whole [Footnote 5: Without prejudging the process for the implementation of the new collective quantified goal on climate finance.]*”

This watered down formulation, especially in the context of “Article 9 as a whole”, was driven by the **developed countries** who made clear that they were willing to discuss Article 9.1 but in the entirety of Article 9, alluding particularly to Articles 9.2 and 9.3 on the voluntary contribution by other Parties and mobilisation of climate finance, respectively, as well as in the context of the NCQG decision. Nonetheless, the work programme is a considerable win given stiff opposition to the issue.

Tripling of adaptation finance by 2035 in the context of NCQG

In the revised text of the [Presidency proposal](#) (of 21 Nov), paragraph 53 read, “Recalls paragraph 18

of decision 1/CMA.3, calls for efforts to triple adaptation finance compared to 2025 levels by 2030, and urges developed country Parties to increase the trajectory of their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties”.

However, the final paragraph 53 of the adopted [Mutirão decision](#) provides: “Reaffirms the doubling by 2025 in paragraph 18 of decision 1/CMA.3 [from Glasgow], calls for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 in the context of decision 1/CMA.6, including paragraph 16 thereof, and urges developed country Parties to increase the trajectory of their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties.”

The call for the provision of tripling of adaptation finance, [in the context of the Glasgow COP26 goal of doubling the provision of adaptation finance to developing countries], was strongly led by the **African Group** and the **LDCs**. They did not link this call to the NCQG decision and premised it instead in the context of Article 9.1 with the provision of finance on adaptation by developed countries.

This became the topmost “red-line” issue for **developed countries** and at the smaller group Presidency consultations, it was the first priority tackled and then agreed upon following difficult talks and maximum flexibility shown by developing countries.

The final watered down formulation by developed countries removes the baseline “from 2025 levels”, and links the tripling of adaptation finance to the NCQG decision, extending the goal post to 2035 from 2030, in alignment with the NCQG decision.

In order to balance the text, the reference to paragraph 16 of the NCQG decision was proposed by the **African Group** and the **LDCs**. [Paragraph 16 of the NCQG decision on provision of public resources via operating entities of the Financial Mechanism and multilateral climate Funds and on “at least triple annual outflows from those Funds from 2022 levels by 2030”.]

Global Implementation Accelerator: Reference to the UAE Consensus

Paragraph 41 of the adopted [Mutirão decision](#) provides: “Decides, in responding to urgency, gaps

and challenges, accelerating implementation, solidarity and international cooperation, to launch the Global Implementation Accelerator, as a cooperative, facilitative and voluntary initiative under the guidance of the Presidencies of the seventh and eighth sessions (November 2026) of the CMA to accelerate implementation across all actors to keep 1.5 °C within reach and supporting countries in implementing their NDCs and NAPs taking into account the decisions referred to in paragraph 15 above, such as the UAE Consensus, requests the Presidencies to present a report summarizing their work in this regard to the CMA at its eighth session, invites the Presidencies to conduct open and inclusive information sessions held in conjunction with the sixty-fourth (June 2026) and sixty-fifth (Nov 2026) sessions of the subsidiary bodies [SBs], and decides to exchange experiences and views on related matters at a high-level event in 2026.”

This language formulation was based on the **EU’s** initial textual proposal that consistently pushed for linkage to the first GST to for NDC implementation. The insertion of paragraph 15 in the text was proposed by the **UK**. The reference to “UAE Consensus” was a compromise as it refers to other decisions as well and not just the first GST. The insertion of the “information sessions” and the “high-level event in 2026” was a compromise offered by developing countries which was accepted by the **EU** and **UK**.

Dialogue, high-level event on international cooperation related to role of trade

The final treatment of the “Promoting international cooperation and addressing the concerns with climate change related trade-restrictive unilateral measures” proposal, as reflected in paragraphs 56 and 57 in the adopted [Mutirão decision](#), ended up in a considerable win considering that it was a red-line “no text” issue for developed countries.

Paragraph 56 “Reaffirms that Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change and also reaffirms that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of

arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”

Paragraph 57 requests the SBs “*to hold a dialogue at their sixty-fourth, sixty-sixth (June 2027) and sixty-eighth sessions (June 2028), with the participation of Parties and other stakeholders, including the International Trade Centre, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the World Trade Organization, to consider opportunities, challenges and barriers in relation to enhancing international cooperation related to the role of trade, taking into account paragraph 56 above, decides to exchange experiences and views on related matters at a high-level event in 2028 and requests the SBs to present a report summarizing the discussions at the high-level event.*”

The addition of holding a “high-level event in 2028” with the SBs to “present a report summarising the discussions at the high-level event” is considered another big win, especially with the push by **Egypt** and supported by other developing countries. This additional language is seen as securing a “balanced” treatment with paragraph 41 on the “Global Implementation Accelerator” which also involves a reporting mechanism and a high-level event.

Paragraph 35 on global net zero

Following the resolution of the sticky issues, sources who spoke to TWN said, that paragraph 35 of the [Presidency proposal](#) (of 21 Nov) was also opened in the end, to ensure a final “balance” to the Mutirão text, with the insertion of “global” next to “net zero” in the paragraph.

Paragraph 35 of the adopted [Mutirão decision](#) provides: “*Notes the importance of aligning NDCs with long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies and encourages Parties to align their NDCs towards global net zero by or around mid-century with a view to keeping 1.5 °C within reach.*”

Preambular paras on equity, differentiation and

developed country mitigation gaps

Developing countries, in securing “balance” in the Mutirão decision, ensured reflection in the preambular paragraphs, of the fundamental principles of “equity” and “common differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR&RC)” [Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the PA].

The decision also underlines the “*critical role of multilateralism based on United Nations values and principles, including in the context of the implementation of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, and the importance of international cooperation for addressing global issues, including climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty*”.

Further, the Mutirão decision recalls “*concerns*” on the “*pre-2020 gaps in both the mitigation ambition and implementation of developed countries and that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change had previously indicated that developed countries must reduce emissions by 25–40 per cent below the 1990 level by 2020, which was not achieved*” and also expresses the “*concern that the carbon budget consistent with achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal is now small and being rapidly depleted and acknowledging that historical cumulative net carbon dioxide emissions account for at least four fifths of the total carbon budget for a 50 per cent probability of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C*”.

These crucial texts reflecting “historical responsibility”, “carbon budget” and the “right to development”, and the bedrock principle of “CBDR&RC” of the Convention and its PA were firmly pushed by the **LMDC** and the **Arab Group** to ensure “equity” and “differentiation” in the final decision.

Much work awaits in the follow-up to the Mutirão decision next year.